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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case involves the regulation of electromagnetic 
spectrum by the Federal Communications Commission. In 
1993, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934, 
47 U.S.C. §§ 151–622, to allow the FCC to grant spectrum 
licenses through a system of competitive bidding. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 309(j)(1), (3). The Act requires the FCC to pursue certain 
objectives required by statute, including 
promoting economic opportunity and 
competition and ensuring that new and 
innovative technologies are readily accessible 
to the American people by avoiding excessive 
concentration of licenses and by disseminating 
licenses among a wide variety of applicants, 
including small businesses, rural telephone 
companies, and businesses owned by members 
of minority groups and women. 
47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B). In FCC parlance, these groups are 
known as designated entities (DEs). 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(a). At 
this time, the FCC’s “principal means of fulfilling the 
statutory objectives for DEs” is to confer bidding credits upon 
small and rural businesses that participate in FCC auctions. 
Updating Competitive Bidding Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. 56764, 
56766 (September 18, 2015). Bidding credits operate as a 
discount on the spectrum DEs purchase, allowing them 
sometimes to outbid companies that make higher bids. 
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Council Tree Comm’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 239 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (Council Tree III).1  
 The question presented here is whether the FCC acted 
legally when it limited the bidding credits available to DEs. 
We hold that it did. 
I 
In 2014, the FCC began a rulemaking proceeding in 
advance of a special 2016–17 Incentive Auction of “scarce 
low-band radio spectrum.” FCC Br. 13. According to its 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC thought it 
appropriate to 
revisit the Commission’s small business 
eligibility rules and evaluate whether to 
rebalance our competing goals in order to 
provide small businesses additional 
opportunities to gain access to new sources of 
capital necessary for participation in the 
provision of spectrum-based services in today’s 
marketplace, while guarding against unjust 
enrichment of ineligible entities. 
                                                 
1 Like the parties, we refer to our 2010 decision as 
Council Tree III as it was preceded by two prior challenges to 
the same rulemaking. See Council Tree Commc’ns v. FCC, 
324 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Council Tree II); Council 
Tree Commc’ns v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(Council Tree I). 
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29 FCC Rcd. 12426 (2014), 2014 WL 5088195 at *7. The 
FCC later indicated in April 2015 that it was specifically 
considering a proposal to cap available DE credits within 
“any given auction” in order to “ensure that DEs cannot 
acquire spectrum in a manner that is wildly disproportionate 
to the concept of a small business.” Request for Further 
Comment, 30 FCC Rcd. 4153, 4158 (2015) (citations 
omitted). 
 On July 21, 2015, the FCC concluded its rulemaking 
and released a final Report and Order entitled In the Matter of 
Updating Part I Competitive Bidding Rules, et al., 30 FCC 
Rcd. 7493 (2015) (hereinafter Order), published at 80 Fed. 
Reg. 56764 (Sept. 18, 2015). In the Order, the FCC issued a 
series of new rules, some designed to assist DEs and others 
intended to rein in perceived abuses of the DE program. New 
rules designed to assist DEs included: “greater flexibility” as 
to certain eligibility requirements, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7504, the 
creation of a “new bidding credit for eligible rural service 
providers,” id. at 7521, and raising the revenue ceiling to 
qualify for DE credits. New measures intended to curb abuses 
included: revenue attribution rules designed to “restric[t] 
certain large carriers or companies from . . . exercising 
control over a DE,” id. at 7511, limitations on joint bidding 
arrangements, and the rule at issue in this case: caps on 
bidding credits.  
  Though the FCC determined generally that small 
business credits should be capped in future auctions, it did not 
mandate a particular dollar value for those caps. Rather, it 
determined that any future cap would be at least $25 million 
per auction. In doing so, the FCC noted that most DEs in 
three recent auctions would not have qualified for more than 
$25 million in bidding credits. The FCC also determined that 
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the $25 million minimum would “allow bona fide small 
businesses” to participate meaningfully in auctions, 
particularly “taking into account the changes we make today 
to increase a DE’s flexibility in other respects.” Id. at 7541. 
Looking to the special 2016–17 Incentive Auction, the FCC 
decided to cap bidding credits at $150 million (well over the 
$25 million minimum) because of the “significant difference 
in value between low-band and higher-band spectrum.” Id. at 
7545. Based on data from prior auctions,2 the FCC predicted 
that the “cap would give small businesses a meaningful 
opportunity to compete” for available licenses in both large 
and small areas. Id. 
 On November 13, 2015, Appellant Council Tree—a 
DE which had opposed caps during the rulemaking—filed a 
petition in this Court for review of the Order, claiming 
violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and the 
Communications Act. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction over Council Tree’s petition 
under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). We 
                                                 
2 The FCC noted that in the three recent auctions 
previously discussed, nearly all DE bids would have been 
unaffected by this cap. Furthermore, reviewing the most 
recent of those three auctions and making appropriate price 
adjustments, the FCC predicted “a $150 million cap would 
not affect a 15 percent or 25 percent bidding credit discount 
for any individual license bid except in the top two markets 
(NY and LA).” 30 FCC Rcd. at 7545. 
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review “agency action, findings, and conclusions” to 
determine whether they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2). Agency action is not arbitrary and capricious when 
the agency “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” 
Council Tree III, 619 F.3d at 250 (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).   
III 
 Council Tree seeks review of the FCC’s Order for 
three reasons. First, it claims the FCC’s explanation of its 
new rule ignored its statutory obligation to promote 
competition and avoid excessive concentration of licenses. 
Second, it argues the imposition of any cap on bidding credits 
was arbitrary and capricious because the FCC lacked 
evidence that the DE designation was being abused. Third, it 
contends the FCC set both its general minimum cap and the 
specific Incentive Auction cap in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner because these particular caps are unsupported by the 
data. We examine each argument in turn. 
A 
 In designing its competitive bidding process, the FCC 
is bound by statute to “promot[e] economic opportunity and 
competition . . . by avoiding excessive concentration of 
licenses.” 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B). Council Tree claims the 
FCC violated its obligation to promote these two objectives 
by not “considering the caps’ anti-competitive effects” or 
“explaining the agency’s reasoning” in how it balanced 
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concern for competition against its other statutory objectives. 
Council Tree Br. 28. 
 In Council Tree III, we considered a similar challenge 
to the FCC’s imposition of a rule restricting the ability of DEs 
to lease or resell their spectrum capacity, which also was 
aimed at addressing abuse of the DE designation. See Council 
Tree III, 619 F.3d at 251. As part of its challenge in that case, 
Council Tree claimed the FCC had violated its statutory duty 
to promote “economic opportunity and competition . . . by 
avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by 
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants”—
since such a rule was likely to impede DEs’ profits and 
growth. Id. at 249 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting 47 
U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B)). 
 We rejected that argument. We noted the FCC’s new 
policy served other statutory objectives, including its 
obligation to “recover a portion of the value of the spectrum 
and prevent unjust enrichment.” Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 309(j)(3)(C)). Citing both “the general agreement that the 
DE program can be abused, [and] the continuing participation 
by DEs in auctions held under the new rules,” we could not 
“conclude that the FCC has failed to promote small-business 
participation at all.” Id. We also recognized that the 
administrative “record reflect[ed] the FCC’s cognizance of 
the capitalization issue, and that it engaged in a line-drawing 
exercise in an attempt to prevent unjust enrichment without 
unduly impairing DEs’ capital access.” Id. at 251–52. 
The FCC’s Order at issue in this appeal did more than 
take cognizance of the issue of DEs’ competitiveness. It 
reviewed data from past auctions before concluding that the 
cap would not significantly impair the ability of DEs (in the 
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aggregate) to compete in auctions. See, e.g., 30 FCC Rcd. at 
7541 (explaining the cap floor with reference to prior DE 
auction participation); id. at 7545–46 (justifying the $150 
million cap with reference to past auction results and pricing 
in different markets). The FCC also noted its bidding credit 
cap was paired with regulations that increased flexibility for 
DEs seeking to obtain capital, bolstering its conclusion that 
DEs would still be able to compete in the spectrum license 
market. See id. at 7541 (referring to the adjusted policy of 
when an investor’s revenue will be attributed to a DE, 
detailed at 30 FCC Rcd. 7502–21). The FCC therefore not 
only set forth a policy that is likely to allow continued 
participation by DEs, but also rationally explained why it 
expected no significant loss of DE participation. As such, 
under the standard we articulated in Council Tree III, the FCC 
did not fail to consider DEs’ ability to compete for licenses.  
Council Tree responds that the statements just noted 
did not relate to the FCC’s obligations to promote 
competition or avoid excessive concentration of licenses at 
all. Rather, they related only to the FCC’s obligation to 
“promote economic opportunity” for DEs. Council Tree Br. 
37. This strikes us as an artificial distinction. The relevant 
statutory language (47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B)) links these 
goals together because they are inextricable. When the FCC 
helps small businesses compete in the marketplace against 
large telecommunications providers, it necessarily increases 
competition for licenses and reduces license concentration.  
What Council Tree seems to suggest is that an 
appropriate analysis by the FCC would not have assessed 
only whether DEs could continue to participate at near-
current levels, but also would have considered whether their 
current level of competition is adequate to challenge our 
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telecommunications quadropoly. See, e.g., Council Tree Br. 
15 & n.31 (referring to the “Big Four” of AT&T, Verizon, 
Sprint, and T-Mobile); id. at 37 (explaining that “the caps’ 
effect on the amount of spectrum,” rather than the number of 
DEs affected by the cap, is “far more relevant” to assessing 
competition); id. at 38 (using auction data to show a mid-level 
DE capped at the minimum of $25 million in bidding credits 
would more than exhaust its credits to win a single license in 
most major markets). The problem with this approach is that 
it adds requirements to the statute not found in the text. The 
FCC’s statutory obligation is to ensure that its bidding system 
promotes competition and the broad dissemination of 
licenses, while also abiding by its obligations to, inter alia, 
“recove[r] for the public a portion of the value” of the 
spectrum licenses sold, avoid “unjust enrichment,” and ensure 
efficient use of spectrum. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B)–(D). As 
much as Council Tree would like the FCC to not merely 
promote, but maximize, competition against the Big Four, 
§ 309 creates no such obligation. And insofar as Council Tree 
comes close to defining “competition” as “competition to [the 
market share of] incumbents in large urban markets, or on a 
regional or national scale,” Council Tree Br. 37, we will not 
insert this limiting language into the statute. See Alabama v. 
North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352 (2010) (“We do not—we 
cannot—add provisions to a federal statute.”) 
The FCC’s Order: (1) preserved a significant bidding 
credit program; (2) reviewed data suggesting DE participation 
would continue despite the proposed caps; and (3) altered 
other rules to make DEs more competitive. We therefore 
“cannot conclude that the FCC has failed to promote small-
business participation at all,” Council Tree III, 619 F.3d at 
249 n.7, or that the Order at issue in this case failed to 
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promote the FCC’s dual objectives of competition and 
reduced concentration of licenses, see 47 U.S.C. 
§ 309(j)(3)(B). 
B 
Council Tree argues that even if the FCC considered 
its statutory objectives under 47 U.S.C. § 309(j), it violated 5 
U.S.C. § 706 by arbitrarily and capriciously imposing caps on 
bidding credits. According to Council Tree, the FCC was 
chasing a phantom because its Order provides no evidence 
that DEs are “gaming the rules” or that DE investors are 
“unjustly enriched.” Council Tree Br. 28–29.  
It is true that the FCC’s Order did little to assess the 
scope and substantiality of the harm posed by large 
companies abusing the DE process. See 30 FCC Rcd. at 
7540–41 (discussing concern for “discourag[ing] entities that 
seek to game the Commission’s rules at taxpayer expense” 
without estimating that expense). However, as we stated in 
Council Tree III, there is at least “general agreement that the 
DE program can be abused” by larger companies. 619 F.3d at 
249 n.7. Council Tree itself acknowledges, though it 
minimizes, complaints made to the FCC about one 
telecommunications company—DISH—abusing the DE 
program in a recent auction by allegedly exercising control 
over DE bidders. And the FCC articulated a concern 
regarding increased incentives for abuse, noting “that, as the 
cost of spectrum continues to grow, the incentives for 
structuring transactions to obtain bidding discounts increase[] 
significantly.” 30 FCC Rcd. at 7540. 
In reviewing the FCC’s explanation for imposing its 
caps, we do not ask whether it would persuade us to impose 
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the same policy. We instead consider whether the agency 
“examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.” Council Tree 
III, 619 F.3d at 250 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).  
Here, the FCC identified a threat (abuse of the DE 
designation) to one of its statutory objectives (preventing 
unjust enrichment), and adopted a prophylactic measure. We 
see no reason to bar such measures as a general matter. See 
Stillwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 519 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[A]gencies can, of course, adopt 
prophylactic rules to prevent potential problems before they 
arise.”).  
It would, of course, be preferable to have some 
estimate of the unjust enrichment that would have been 
anticipated had the FCC not capped bidding credits. And 
perhaps a prophylactic rule could be irrational if an agency 
(1) made no effort to measure its benefits, and (2) its impact 
on other statutory obligations was also unassessed (or 
negative). See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 
F.3d 431, 469-72 (3d Cir. 2011). But as explained in Part III-
A, supra, the FCC articulated a rational explanation, based on 
relevant data, as to why it believed its bidding credit caps 
would have only a minor impact on DEs’ ability to compete 
in the spectrum license marketplace. 
Though Council Tree objects that the FCC did not 
truly balance its obligations here, Council Tree III is again 
instructive. In that case we found the question of whether the 
rule restricting spectrum leasing was arbitrary and capricious 
“a close one” on first review, because “the FCC made few 
factual findings on the impact of the new rules on DE 
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financing.” Council Tree III, 619 F.3d at 251.  But despite the 
lack of concrete findings, we found “enough consideration of 
[the negative impact on] DE capitalization to pass the 
arbitrary and capricious threshold.” Id. at 253. 
We reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, the 
FCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking “reflect[ed] the FCC’s 
cognizance of the capitalization issue” based on its stated 
concern for a “delicate balance” between avoiding abuse and 
allowing small businesses to access flexible sources of 
capital. Id. at 251–52 (citation omitted). Second, we noted 
that predictions about the future impact of rules were 
“inherently speculative.” Id. at 252. Under our “necessarily 
deferential” review of “line-drawing determinations,” id. at 
250–51 (citation omitted), we found it unnecessary to demand 
more despite the FCC’s consideration being “neither as clear 
nor as thorough as would be ideal,” id. at 252–53. 
Unlike the rulemaking in Council Tree III, the FCC in 
this matter made factual findings on the likely impact of this 
new rule on DE auction competitiveness. Whether the FCC is 
right or wrong that the impact will be minimal, we cannot say 
its prediction is irrational based on the relevant data of record. 
The FCC’s balancing here was not arbitrary and capricious.3 
                                                 
3 As a subsidiary argument, Council Tree suggests that 
the Order actually reflects an FCC determination “that DEs 
should be nothing more than bit players in the wireless 
industry.” Council Tree Br. 28. Because “[t]he caps only 
apply to businesses the FCC has already deemed to be bona 
fide DEs,” Council Tree reasons that “there can be no claim 
that the caps are necessary to limit bidding credits to the kinds 
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C 
Finally, we consider Council Tree’s challenge to the 
specific caps imposed. Council Tree raises three related 
arguments contesting the rationality of these caps, none of 
which we find persuasive. 
First, Council Tree complains that focusing on the 
number of affected DEs, instead of on their ability to break 
into major markets, is a poor way to measure the impact of a 
cap on competition. As discussed, we review the FCC’s 
reasoning to confirm that it used relevant data—not that it 
applied the most rigorous analysis available. Here, the FCC 
reviewed relevant auction data before evaluating whether the 
caps on bidding credits would reduce competition. 
Second, Council Tree argues that DEs were so 
hampered by old rules in two of the auctions that those 
                                                                                                             
of small businesses Congress had in mind.” Id. at 45. Leaving 
aside the term “necessary,” which is irrelevant to a review for 
rationality, the FCC’s Order explains that its cap acts as “an 
important additional safeguard—or backstop” when its other 
measures for assessing bona fide DE status have failed. 30 
FCC Rcd. at 7540. Council Tree’s related argument on 
efficacy—including that the penalties in place are sufficiently 
“extensive,” Council Tree Br. 49, and that the caps “do not 
eliminate the alleged incentives for gamesmanship,” id. at 
51—are by and large policy disagreements that do not 
undercut the rationality of the FCC’s determination that 
bidding credit caps would serve as a safeguard against 
gamesmanship. 
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auctions should not have been used in estimates, and that 
even the third (ostensibly adequate) auction cannot be 
compared to the “once-in-a-generation” Incentive Auction. 
Council Tree Br. 58 (quoting Order ¶ 95). Here again, we 
review only for the use of relevant, not perfect, data. Council 
Tree III, 619 F.3d at 250. And Council Tree has not offered, 
in briefing or at argument, any alternative data that the FCC 
should have considered in its estimates. 
Finally, Council Tree argues that the FCC’s 
justifications in support of the $25 million minimum on 
bidding credit caps and its $150 million cap for the Incentive 
Auction would be as consistent with limits of “$200 million, 
$500 million, or more,” making its explanation inadequate. 
Council Tree Br. 58. In support of this argument, Council 
Tree points to Bluewater Network v. EPA, where the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ordered the EPA to clarify the 
basis of its determination that only 70% of new snowmobiles 
in eight years could be fitted with emission reduction 
technology. 370 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Bluewater 
court held the EPA’s statements regarding cost concerns for 
manufacturers—that design takes time and manufacturers 
have finite resources—were too vague. See id. (“The 
Agency’s explanation of its reasoning could just as well 
support standards corresponding to 30% or 100% application 
in that time frame.”). By contrast, the FCC’s analysis here 
would not be consistent with a bidding credit cap of any 
value. For example, the FCC rejected caps of $10 million and 
$25 million for the Incentive Auction as less consistent with 
historical bidding thresholds. While the FCC did not 
explicitly reject any upper boundary as too high, we note that 
it set the $150 million cap such that, while “nearly all of the 
small businesses that claimed bidding credits . . . would have 
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fallen under” the cap, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7545, two successful 
DEs in one of the previous auctions would have exceeded it. 
Council Tree admits those two DEs, allegedly “financed in 
large part by investments from DISH,” prompted the concern 
that led to this rulemaking, allowing us to infer grounds for an 
upper bound in the record. Council Tree Br. 20. Even 
excluding that inference, however, the sources underlying the 
decision here are much more concrete than those in 
Bluewater. Besides, setting a reasonable cap is a 
quintessential “line-drawing determination[]” calling for 
“necessarily deferential” review in this Court. Council Tree 
III, 619 F.3d at 250–51 (citation omitted).  
In sum, the FCC made a “rational connection” between 
“relevant data” and the caps on bidding credits under review. 
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  
IV 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the FCC’s Order 
dated July 21, 2015 and published on September 18, 2015 
was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise contrary to law. We will deny Council Tree’s 
petition for review. 
